

CHAPTER FIVE – EVALUATION CRITERIA

The following criteria were used to evaluate the organizational options looking both at past and future issues and opportunities.

- A. The ability to improve **Safety and risk management** for complex incident management. *(Study Objective)*
- B. The ability to improve the **local unit natural and cultural resource management and fire program management objectives** of federal and state land management agencies. *(Study Objective)*
- C. The ability to improve the agency's **objectives for complex incident management and non-fire**. *(Study Objective)*
- D. The ability to improve **inter-agency and inter-governmental cooperation and efficiencies**. This includes the inclusion of state and local government personnel needed to accomplish an option. *(Study Objective)*
- E. **Agency acceptance** of the organizational option. Agency is defined as the agency administrators and fire management leadership of the participating NWCG agencies.
- F. Efficiently meet the direction of the **National Response Plan** in compliance with Presidential Homeland Security Directive #5-8.
- G. The ability to improve the development of **fire leadership**, for both complex incident and fire program management development.

CHAPTER SIX – EVALUATION OF OPTIONS

A. RANKING OF OPTIONS

****KEY ASSUMPTION:** In all options other than Option 1, the incident size, type and complexity will determine the response, number of team members and configuration.

Following are evaluation scoring the used for each of the options:

- 5 – Meets all evaluation
- 4 – Meets most >80%
- 3 – Meets most >60%
- 2 – Meets most >40%
- 1 – Meets some <20%
- 0 – Does not meet

Some of the options, if accepted, only address complex incident management issues that fix “yesterday’s problems,” but do not strategically address future issues. Some of the options fail to provide sufficient people to accomplish land and resource management objectives and fire program management objectives on the home unit. Some options offer few opportunities to improve inter-agency and inter-governmental efficiencies. The consequences of failure are that the agencies will simultaneously fail in meeting the four key project objectives.

Funding: The chart on page ** displays a comparative analysis of the cost of each of the alternatives. Factors included in determining the costs include:

- **Cost to implement:** salary to staff IMTs is the only cost used in this figure. An average \$500.00 per day is used to compensate for the variability in salary costs for federal, state, local and private fire service employees. There was no attempt to calculate costs associated with transfer or station, space etc
- **Costs of forgone natural resources:** salary of “militia” resources for the number of days away from their home office

Option 1—Current Organization (Non-NIMO)

Safety: Rated 3, was not rated higher due to fatigue factor for existing teams with back to back assignments, and spending time catching up when returning to home unit.

Land, Cultural and Resource Fire Management Objectives: Rated 0, current organization does a poor job of meeting the competing needs of all three (Land & Resource, Fire Program Management and Complex Incident Management). With 4634 volunteer militia committed each year to complex incident management, which is not accomplished.

Complex Incident Management Objectives: Rated 2, currently meets greater than 40% of the time, with many substitutions on the existing teams, competition for overhead among teams and statistics prove the number of existing teams are going down, can not meet all the needs of the future in this criteria.

Participation of non-fed agency resources: Rated 4, other agencies participate now for the overtime, and other moneys coming into those departments. Agencies participate because of experience, wildland fire expertise, and recognition. Generally, the current org. has about 25% participation from non-federal sources performance standards to measure the work.

Agency Acceptance: Rated 4, Staying with the status quo is comfortable

Meets needs of National Response Plan (NRP): Rated 2, the current is a wildland fire organization and is mobilized accordingly. With the current peak use in the summer, the current will do a poor job of meeting NRP request during the same time period. Current teams are effective with the assignments, but the efficiencies of the operations could be maximized with relationship development in Homeland Security Agencies, the time to do this now with current organizations is simply not available.

Leadership: Rated 2, the current organization is only partially meeting the leadership training needs of the existing IMTs and other fire program management needs because all come from the volunteer militia consequently no continuity in the program.

Option 2—Current number of IMTs with strong local T3 organizations and 3 year commitment (Non-NIMO)

Safety: Rated 4, higher score than current because T3 IMT organizations would be more successful in extended attack, thus potentially reducing mobilization of both T1 and T2 IMTs, additionally the transitions would be more effective with T3 IMT organizations.

Land, cultural and Resource and Fire Program Management Objectives: Rated 0, current organization does a poor job of meeting the competing needs of all three (Land & Resource, Fire Program Management and Complex Incident Management). With 4634 volunteer militia committed each year to complex incident management, that work is not accomplished.

Complex Incident Management Objectives: Rated 3, higher because of quality transitions, and development of pipeline of people to T1 and T2 IMTs from T3 IMT organizations.

Participation of non-federal agencies: Rated 4, same as Option 1.

Agency Acceptance: Rated 3 because the 3-year commitment and formal T3 IMT organizations will not be universally accepted by the agencies.

Meets needs of NRP: Rated 3 because of the use of T3 IMT organizations, NRP incidents at the local level would be effectively managed and the building blocks from T3 to T1 would become important in these incidents.

Leadership: Rated 3, with the changes in policy making volunteer militia more available, improvements to leadership training would be recognized but still limited due to the volunteer status us incident management personnel and lack of program continuity

Option 3—60 IMT's, consisting of 20-T1's and 40 T-2's with 30 full-time NIMO positions on each IMT.

Safety: Rated 4, because 60 full-time IMTs will be focused specifically on safety issues 100% of the time the rating is higher.

Land, Cultural and Resource Management Objectives: Rated 3, although less volunteer militia people will be available to stay home to accomplish work, over 1820 would now be available.

Complex Incident Management objectives: Rated 4, with full-time teams, this criterion will be accomplished most of the time. NIMO personnel would be available to provide quality training in complex incident management to future IMT members.

Participation of non-federal agencies: Rated 4, participation would increase with a need to fill 50% of support positions on IMTs.

Agency Acceptance: Rated 2, this approach is substantially different thus high level of agency resistance.

Meets needs of NRP: Rated 4, full-time teams would be staffed yearlong to meet NRP needs.

Leadership: Rated 5, with 1820 people who are full-time NIMO employees, leadership training to both IMTs and cadre for fire program management leadership training will be readily available.

Option 4—60 IMT's, 20 T-1's and 40 T-2's 50 IMTs with short team configuration (NIMO) on each IMT.

Safety: Rated 4, even though less full time number of people, with Command and General Staff positions filled, high emphasis on safety.

Land, Cultural and Resource Management Objectives: Rated 3, about the same as previous option.

Complex Incident Management objectives: Rated 4, same as previous option. NIMO personnel would be available to provide quality training in complex incident management to future IMT members.

Participation of non-federal agencies: Rated 4, high level of participation.

Agency Acceptance: Rated 3, this approach would still allow agency participation thus not a substantial change from the current situation.

Meets needs of NRP: Rated 4, full-time teams would be staffed yearlong to meet NRP needs.

Leadership: Rated 4, with 10 people per IMT, training would improve over the current system but reduced numbers of full-time NIMO personnel would provide less training opportunity.

Option 5—60 IMTs; 16 full time NIMO; 44 Type 2 IMTs entirely staffed and supported by Geographic Areas

Safety: Rated 4, 16 full time IMTs with high emphasis on safety.

Land, Cultural and Resource Management Objectives: Rated 3, about the same as previous option

Complex Incident Management objectives: Rated 5, this option provides the highest capability to meet this criterion. NIMO personnel would be available to provide quality training in complex incident management to future IMT members.

Participation of non-federal agencies: Rated 4, high level of participation.

Agency Acceptance: Rated 3, this approach would still allow agency participation thus not a substantial change from current situation.

Meets needs of NRP: Rated 4, 16 full-time teams would be staffed yearlong to meet NRP needs.

Leadership: Rated 5, with approximately 980 full-time NIMO personnel, all leadership needs will be met.

RANKING OF OPTIONS WITH EVALUATION CRITERIA

	1	2	3	4	5
Safety/risk management	3	4	4	4	4
Land/Resource Management	0	0	3	3	3
Meet F.P.M. objectives	2	3	4	4	5
Participation of non-federal agencies	4	4	4	4	4
SUB-TOTAL	9	11	15	15	16
Agency acceptance	4	3	2	3	3
Efficiently meet needs of the NRP	2	3	4	4	4
Facilitate accelerated leadership development for both complex Incident and Fire Program Management.	2	3	5	4	5
TOTAL	21	24	34	34	34

Evaluation scoring:

5 – Meets all evaluation
4 – Meets most >80%
3 – Meets most >60%

2 – Meets most >40%
1 – Meets some <20%
0– Does not meet

OPTION IMPLEMENTATION COSTS

OPTION	1	2	3	4	5
Cost to implement	\$41.0	\$41.0	\$280.0	\$146.0	\$178.0
Costs of forgone natural resources	\$123.0	\$123.0	\$43.0	\$65.0	\$51.0
Total cost	\$167.0	(\$3.0)	\$323.0	\$211.0	\$229.0
Net cost change above/below the current	0	0	\$156.0	\$44.0	\$62.0

FISCAL STAFFING TOTALS/COMMITMENT

OPTION	Cost/IMT	Total people	Days out NIMO	Days out VM/PSL
1	\$2.99mm	6192	0	54
2	\$2.52mm	7820	0	42
3	\$5.38mm	5870	88	42
4	\$3.52mm	5900	119	49
5	\$3.82mm	5660	130	44

Value of Remaining on the Home Unit

The Glossary succinctly defines Lands and Resource Management Objectives and Fire Program Management. In several options, several thousand people would remain on the home unit to accomplish both Land and Resource Management Objectives and complete Fire Program Management tasks. While each offer intangible values and in the past has been viewed as an illusive number, there are some “bottomline” numbers, which show the value of staying home.

Providing sound and professional advice in Land and Resource Management produces better Wildland Fire Situation Analysis' (WFSA) and certainly other land management decisions are made by people who understand the nuances and unique situations of the home unit. The value of remaining home and accomplishing the full-range of Fire Program Management duties can be quantified. Currently in the United States we are successful approximately 98% of the time with initial and extended attack. We spend the most moneys on the remaining 2% of the wildland fires. Some options create the opportunity to maximize availability on the home unit. If collectively the success ratio improved to 99% with initial and extended attack, a potential cost saving of 50% of the large fire costs could be realized. In the last three years the suppression costs have reached or exceeded \$1 billion. Using a simplistic linear deduction model, the potential savings over the last three years would have been \$500 million annually. Another example is taking the \$ 1 billion figure and dividing the 2 percentage's by 1/10th would potentially save \$50 million for each 1/10th percentage points gained by maintaining a strong initial and extended attack (including Type 5, 4 and 3 organizations) on the home unit. Another advantage is accomplishing fuels management project including both planning and implementation. Treating fire-adapted ecosystems is the long-term strategic solution but the same people staffing Incident Management Teams are the same people who are unavailable to accomplish the fuels portion of Fire Program Management.

CHAPTER SIX – GLOSSARY

- AA** – The **Agency Administrator** is the unit manager with responsibility for the unit for a federal or state agency, or local government.
- AD** – Term or acronym for **Administratively Determined**, which is used to calculate pay-rate for various positions and skills while engaged in incident management.
- All-Risk (Non-wildland fire response)** – Any incident management response for all activities other than wildland fire.
- Complex** – A complex is two or more individual incidents located in the same general proximity which are assigned to a single Incident Commander or Unified Command to facilitate management.
- Complex Incident Management (CIM)** – Management of a complex or the management of a major incident that includes multiple operational periods and usually more than 1000 personnel assigned. CIM may include the establishment of branches on the incident.
- Federal Wildland Fire Reserve Program** – A program to be developed that utilizes trained and qualified personnel that are no longer in the federal service that are willing to commit to availability for a prescribed period of time per year to meet emergency response position shortages. This model would be similar to the military reserve program.
- Fire Program Management** – Providing any of the following on an administrative unit: initial attack, extended attack, protection staffing, dispatch and coordination, seasonal severity planning, fuels management, aviation, fire prevention, detection, fire planning, WFSA development, and fire program budgeting on an administrative unit.
- FTE (Full Time Equivilant)** - One FTE equals 260 work days per year.
- FUMT – Fire Use Management Teams** provide skilled and mobile personnel to assist with the management of wildland fire use for cultural and resource benefits and prescribed fires.
- GACCs** – There are 11 **Geographic Area Coordination Centers** in the United States. The GACCs establish priorities, coordinate resource mobilization and serve as the Multi-Area Coordination (MAC) function until Preparedness Level 4 is reached in the Geographic Area. Due to their high incident management activity levels, the California Geographic Area and the Great Basin Geographic Area each have two GACCs.

Geographic Areas – There are nine Geographic Areas in the United States, consistent with the nine Forest Service Regions. Their primary responsibility is to coordinate fire-related activities within the geographical area.

Geographic Area Coordinating Groups – Are comprised of representatives of federal and state agencies and local government that oversee and facilitate the implementation of interagency standards developed at the national and geographic areas. There are nine Geographic Area Coordinating Groups.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 – A directive signed by the President that directs all Departments and Agencies to work together to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 – A directive signed by the President that directs all Departments and Agencies to identify and prioritize United States critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist attacks.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 – A directive signed by the President that establishes policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic all-hazard preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for improving delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and local governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State and local entities.

Incident Complexity – When complexity levels exceed initial response capabilities, the appropriate Incident Command System positions should be added commensurate with the complexity of the incident. Based on an Incident Complexity Analysis, the Agency Administrator selects the appropriate management structure to provide for safe and efficient incident operations. Typically, incident complexity ranges from a Type 5 (least complex) through Type 1 (most complex).

IPA – Intergovernmental Personnel Act, which allows federal agencies to exchange employees with other state, federal, or local government agencies.

IMTs – Incident Management Teams are pre-identified within geographic areas—as well as nationally—to management complex incidents.

Land and Resource Management Objectives – The natural and cultural resources on public lands in the United States. Federal and state agencies are charged with protecting these resources, developing management plans, and implementing “best management practices” on these lands.

Long/Short IMTs – Incident Management Teams are configured either as a short team with Command and General Staff, or as a long team with Command or General Staff and all unit/group leader positions filled. The National Mobilization Guide defines both configurations.

MAC – Multi-Agency Coordination (or, in most instances, a **MAC Group**) exists full-time, but is generally formalized at Preparedness Level 4 or higher. Each Geographic Area has a MAC Group, as does the National Interagency Fire Center. Representation on MAC Groups is from the federal, state, and local governments. MAC Groups set priorities and allocate or re-allocate scarce resources to incidents utilizing the coordination system to mobilize or re-allocate resources.

NIMO – National Incident Management Organization, also synonymous with the term Large Fire Suppression Organization. NIMO is an organization of full-time employees whose primary mission is complex incident management.

NRP – National Response Plan, managed by the Department of Homeland Security, which will replace the Federal Response Plan and.

NWCG – The National Wildfire Coordinating Group is comprised of representatives of federal and state agencies who provide a formalized system through which agreements may be reached on substantive issues in fire management

Private Wildland Fire Services: Any private sector entity including companies, organizations or individuals, who will provide services under a contractual agreement.

Rehire – A person who has left the federal or state government (through retirement) who returns to work either through the Administratively Determined (AD) pay scale, or returns to the previous grade and earns the difference between the retirement annuity and the current pay scale.

Rehired Annuitant – A person who has left the federal government and returns at the previous grade and is paid the current pay scale with no penalty to the retirement annuity.

Service First - Presidential authority which authorizes the Bureau of Land Management and Forest Service to delegate duties, responsibilities and authorities; thereby allowing an employee of either agency the authority to act in full force and effect of the other agency

Shoulder Season - That period of time from October 1st until June 1st of each calendar year which are the months of least utilization of Incident Management Teams

occur, or approximately 25% of all mobilizations for the entire calendar year occur during this time frame. The peak time (75%) of IMT mobilization is June through September.

Type 3-5 Incident Management Organizations – Organizations pre-identified for initial and extended attack operations, ranging from the Type 3 to Type 5 complexity incident. The Type 5 incident includes two to six personnel; a Type 4 complexity incident has an Incident Commander and either a single module to several resources; a Type 3 complexity incident has an Incident Commander, some or all command and general staff positions and resources that vary from several resources to several task forces/strike teams. This standard has been established as policy for each complexity level and can be found in the Interagency Fire Operations Handbook, Chapter 10, Incident Management.

Volunteer militia System – Utilizing personnel with full or part-time positions other than full-time complex incident management in federal or state agencies to staff complex incident management organizations.

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CHAPTER SEVEN – LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

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CHAPTER EIGHT – TEAM MEMBERS

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